This is the second post on the negligent security appeal that the New York Court of Appeals will address next year. (Last week's post here.) As I discussed last week, the First and Second Departments have conflicting views on analyzing negligent security claims.
The majority opinion in Scurry v New York City Hous. Auth. explains the Second Department's view on how the First Department analyzes negligent security cases when an attack is “targeted” rather than “random.” In Scurry, a former fiancé killed the decedent in the apartment building where she lived. The decedent lived on the sixth floor of the apartment building. The fiancé allegedly entered the apartment building through the street-level front door of the apartment building. The front door's lock had a history of inoperability during the three months preceding the fatal attack. The defendant New York City Housing Authority owned and maintained the apartment building.
In support of its motion for summary judgment, the NYCHA argued, among other issues, that the fiancé's targeted, premeditated attack of the decedent broke the causal nexus between any of its negligence in failing to maintain an operable lock on the building's door. The NYCHA drew a distinction between a random attack and the targeted attack like the one that happened to decedent. The reasoning of the targeted attack argument is that any reasonable security measures would likely not have deterred an attacker's actions in a premeditated, targeted attack. The reasoning invokes the intervening cause logic, breaking the chain between any negligence of the property owner and the resulting attack.
Writing for the majority, Justice Dillon provides an excellent overview of negligent security caselaw in New York, highlighting cornerstone Court of Appeals' decisions and analyzing the First and Second Departments' cases throughout the years. He identifies a "problem" with the First Department's analysis of negligent security cases by basing a conclusion on whether an attack is targeted or random: "The problem with basing a conclusion as to liability on the distinction between 'targeted' and 'random' attacks is that the binary dichotomy between those two categories of crime, by mechanically focusing on the perpetrator's intent, fails to account for the myriad of facts that may be present in a given case."
Again, the context of the Scurry appeal is on summary judgment motion, so Justice Dillon's analysis focuses on the evidentiary proof a property owner needs to proffer to meet its initial burden on the motion. Justice Dillon concludes that the NYCHA failed to meet its initial burden. On behalf of the majority, Justice Dillon concludes that the NYCHA provided no evidence that its alleged negligently maintained street-level, front door played no concurrent role in enabling the attacker's criminal conduct at the specific date, time, and place of his crime, however premeditated that criminal conduct might have been. Notably, Justice Dillon points out the importance of the fundamental tort concept that there can be more than one proximate cause of an occurrence or injury.
Justice Dillon sets forth a clear rule concerning negligent security claims within the context of a motion for summary judgment: "The test in determining summary judgment motions involving negligent door security should therefore not focus on whether the crime committed within the building was 'targeted' or 'random,' but whether or not, and to what extent, an alleged negligently maintained building entrance was a concurrent contributory factor in the happening of the criminal occurrence." Justice Dillon also reminds practitioners of the burden-shifting analysis when parties move for summary judgment.
Next week, we will discuss the First Department's response to the Scurry decision.
Photo Credit: Bill Badzo
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