In Runner, the plaintiff injured both of his hands while installing an Unterruptible Power System. The plaintiff and his co-workers were attempting move a large reel of wire, which weighed approximately 800 pounds, down a set of about 4 stairs. To prevent the reel from rolling down the flight and causing damage, the workers were instructed to tie one end of a 10-foot length of rope to the reel and then to wrap the rope around a metal bar placed horizontally across a door jamb on the same level as the reel.
The plaintiff and two workers held the loose end of the rope while two other worker began to push the reel down the stairs. As the reel descended, it pulled the plaintiff and his fellow workers, who were essentially acting as counterweights, toward the metal bar. The plaintiff was drawn horizontally in the bar, injuring his hands as they jammed their hands against the bar.
The case came to the Court of Appeals via a certified question of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The Court of Appeals rejected the defendant's argument that sec. 240(1) did not apply because the occurrence did not involve the traversal of an elevation differential either by the plaintiff or an object that hit him. The defendant was essentially pointing to prior case law -- e.g., Narducci v. Manhasset Bay -- for the proposition that gravity must operate directly upon either the plaintiff or upon an object falling upon the plaintiff if there is to be sec. 240(1) liability. From analyzing this line of case law, the defendant had a point.
Not so, the Court held. The Court recognized that prior case law recognized the two scenarios where sec. 240(1) applied, but noted that the Court's reference to those scenarios was not exhaustive. It essentially wedged this analysis into a gap in the holding in Narducci. The questions becomes: Did we know that there were gaps in Narducci and similar case law?
The Court noted that the key to sec. 240(1) liability was shielding the injured worker from harm directly flowing from the application of the force of gravity to an object or person.
The Court held that the relevant inquiry in a falling object case is whether the harm flows directly from the application of the force of gravity to the object; it does not depend upon whether the object has hit the worker.
What about the elevation level being de minimis? The Court noted that, even though the accident concerned the height differential of 4 steps, the elevation differential here cannot be viewed as de minimis. The Court noted the reel's weight and amount of force it was capable of generating to reject the de minimis elevation differential claim.
Based on this holding, the elevation differential analysis now seems to include the character of the object that fell -- i.e., weight, force capability, and any other factor that would pose a danger to the injured worker.
Perhaps the most interesting aspects of this holding are (1) it might signal a shift in the Court's view toward sec. 240(1) actions (see also Affri v. Basch [discussed in a future post], and (2) the impact it will have at the trial and intermediate appellate level.
Suffice it to say the Court in Runner has tacitly admitted that its Labor Law decisions of the past decade where the Court reached decisions - almost all decided in favor of defendants - ignoring precedent on point were nothing more than ad hoc decisions against plaintiffs on a law the Court simply did not like, which decisions the Court will now not be beholden to. This dangerous tactic of the Court which made the injured construction worker the most reviled plaintiff in NY law made NY Labor Law a mess, with no one knowing what the law is. As proof of that one only needs to read the Second Circuit's decision in Runner where that Court damned with faint praise the Court of Appeals.
Posted by: Michael Hutter | December 24, 2009 at 01:56 PM
In contrast to Michael's comment, I don't believe it's really been that confusing, or that the Court of Appeals has really changed course that much. The Runner case involved the failure to provide a proper hoist or pully. That, in itself, raises red flags that it's probably a Labor Law 240(1) case. A good practitioner, as this one apparently did, will make the case (as well as any applicable 241(6) and common law case), and argue it vigorously.
The fact that he was pulled up, rather than falling down or having an object fall, is not dispositive. The defendants argued that it was, based on the "de minimus height differential" mush that they have gotten the Court to pay lip service to for decades, but there are a litany of decisions saying that Labor Law cases aren't black and white.
The Labor Law is one of those statutes where there is a grey area for borderline cases. It's a broad statute, covering a wide range of factual scenarios. Labor Law cases are also constantly being subject to summary judgment motions, then being appealed. Frequently, Defendants throw out seemingly absurd arguments in the hope that they will get a trial judge or appellate panel to issue a slightly more defense friendly decision.
At least for the last decade, the Court of Appeals has given the statute a fairly consistent treatment. The decisions from the 90's can be a bit confusing, and can generally be read different ways, but are still mostly consistent with the Court's current interpretation. The decisions are made on a case-by-case basis, and thus the Court doesn't address factual scenarios that aren't before it.
Posted by: Scott Kreppein | December 26, 2009 at 01:27 PM
See Eric Turkewitz's excellent post on this case here
http://www.newyorkpersonalinjuryattorneyblog.com/2009/12/ny-labor-law-what-is-elevation-related.html#links
Posted by: Matt | December 28, 2009 at 08:03 PM