This past June, the New York Court of Appeals' decided an important insurance coverage issue in BP Air Conditioning Corp. v. One Beacon Ins. Grp. The appeal concerned a Comprehensive General Liability insurance policy. BP Air Conditioning was a subcontractor on a job at the World Trade Center. BP subcontracted the HVAC-related work to Alfa Piping Corp. The purchase order between BP and Alfa included an indemnification provision, hold harmless clause, and required Alfa to name BP as an additional insured on its CGL policy. Defendant One Beacon issued the CGL policy.
An employee of yet another subcontractor commenced suit against the general contractor for injuries he allegedly sustained on the worksite. The general contractor commenced a third-party action against BP and Alfa, and the plaintiff then commenced a direct action against BP and Alfa.
BP tendered its defense to One Beacon as an additional insured on Alfa's CGL policy. One Beacon declined to defend BP but defended Alfa. One Beacon's argument in opposition to a summary judgment motion BP made in a declaratory judgment action seeking One Beacon to provide it a defense was as follows: it was not obligated to defend BP
until it was determined that the plaintiff's alleged injury arose out of
Alfa's activities, and that One Beacon's responsibility, if any, for
the costs of BP's defense could not be determined without considering other relevant policies at issue.
There are two important points to the Court of Appeals' decision:
1. The Court rejected One Beacon's argument that its duty to defend was only triggered when a determination of liability is made. It held that "[a] duty to defend is triggered by the allegations contained in the underlying complaint." This holding further reinforces that the duty to defend is broader than a duty to indemnify.
2. Practitioners should stop reading the Court's prior holding in Pecker Ironworks of N.Y., Inc. v. Traveler's Ins. Co. in an extremely broad fashion. In Pecker, the Court held that where two entities enter into an agreement where one will name the other as an additional insured, the implicit understanding is that the coverage for the additional insured is primary, not excess. The Court in
BP dispelled that Pecker stood for the proposition that the additional insured coverage is always primary to other coverage for the named insured, irrespective of an "other insurance' clause.
A quick read of Pecker in concert with BP will clarify the point.