As New York Civil Law has discussed in prior posts (see most recently here), the New York Court of Appeals has no problem dismissing an injured plaintiff's action within the context of a Labor Law sec. 240(1) claim where he or she is the proximate cause of his or her injuries . How has the Court's sole proximate cause analysis impacted the Appellate Division Departments?
This recent appeal in the Appellate Division, Third Department provides some insight. In Canino v. Electronic Techs. Co., the injured worker fell off an A-frame ladder while installing some security equipment at the defendant owner's facility. The general contractor and facility owner demonstrated that the ladder provided to the plaintiff was open and locked after the accident, and that the ladder had rubber footings on it. Thus, the defendants argued that the plaintiff was the sole proximate cause of his injuries.
The plaintiff argued that a scaffold rather than the ladder was proper protection for this particular worksite. Although the Third Department denied the plaintiff's summary judgment motion pursuant to sec. 240(1), the plaintiff escaped summary dismissal against it by arguing that the ladder was not an adequate safety device given the space constraints of the worksite.
The Third Department concluded that issues of fact existed as to whether the plaintiff was afforded proper protection regarding his use of the A-frame ladder. I wouldn't say that this conclusion is a complete victory for the sole proximate cause analysis, but I do think that the Appellate Division Departments are starting to develop a distinct body of case law concerning the analysis.
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